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One of the most important tasks faced by a Program
Manager at the initiation of a major systems acquisition
program is the formulation of the program's acquisition
strategy. In this study, the researcher identifies the
principal characteristics of an acquisition strategy,
discusses the constraints and limitations which must be
considered in its development, and considers the realities
involved in the formulation process. The study also inves-
tigates the concept of strategic planning and its applica-
bility in the major systems acquisition process. In Chapter
V, the study develops a methodology for the formulation of
an acquisition strategy at program initiation. The study
concludes that in the major systems acquisition process
there exists a lack of a clear distinction between acquisi-
tion strategies and acquisition plans, a lack of long range
planning, and a failure of higher levels to clearly communi-
cate overall strategies, .policies, and priorities which will
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL
One of the first tasks faced by a program manager (PM)
at program initiation is the development of an acquisition
strategy for the program. The acquisition strategy will
encompass all aspects of the program including the manage-
ment concepts to be utilized in the direction and control of
the program, the identification of contracting alternatives,
test and evaluation requirements, logistics support, manning
and training requirements, funding profiles, and a host of
other issues. [Ref. l:p. 2]
One of the key problems in accomplishing this task is
the identification of the factors that need to be considered
and planned for during the course of the acquisition
process. The program manager is required to make decisions
in the early part of the program which can have a dramatic
effect on the options that will be available to him later on
in the program. The acquisition strategy is a vehicle which
allows the program manager to evaluate and integrate these
decisions so that as few options as possible are eliminated
early in the program cycle.
Currently, a program manager receives guidance in the
development of his acquisition strategy through various
procurement directives and from advice passed informally by
current and former program managers. A management tool does
not currently exist which assists the program manager in
this endeavor.
This study will investigate the development of an acqui-
sition strategy at program initiation and develop a method-
ology to aid program managers in this effort.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The objectives of this study were: (1) to investigate
the concept of strategic planning, (2) identify the major
factors which need to be considered in the development of an
acquisition strategy, (3) discuss the realites involved in
the acquisition strategy formulation process, and (4) to
develop a methodology to assist program managers in devel-
oping an acquisition strategy at program initiation.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To achieve the objectives of the research, the following
question was posed: What would be the major characteristics
of a systems acquisition strategy methodology which could be
used by program managers at program initiation?
To answer the basic research question, the following
subsidiary questions were addressed:
1. What is an acquisition strategy?
2. What are the general policies governing the develop-
ment of an individual program acquisition strategy?
3. What are the major factors which need to be consid-
ered in the development of an acquisition strategy?
4. How could these factors be integrated into a
decision-making methodology which could be used by
program managers?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The information presented in this study was obtained
from (1) currently available literature, (2) telephonic and
personal interviews with personnel knowledgeable in the
acquisition arena, and (3) interviews with program managers
and other program office personnel. The literature search
included the Naval Postgraduate School Library, Defense
10
Technical Information Center, Defense Logistics Studies
Information Exchange and applicable directives and instruc-
tions governing the acquisition process. Personnel inter-
viewed during the conduct of the research are listed in
Appendix A. The questionnaire used during the interviews is
contained in Appendix B.
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This study is limited to major systems acquisition as
currently practiced by the Department of Defense (DoD) . The
focus of the study was on the development of a systems
acquisition strategy methodology which program managers
could use to assist them in the development of their
program's acquisition strategy at program initiation.
Policies affecting the development of acquisition strategy
will be discussed, but a detailed analysis of these policies
will not be presented.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The organization of this study generally follows the
arrangement of the research questions. Chapter II presents
an overview of the systems acquisition process, a conceptual
view of long range planning, definitions, and a discussion
of the evolution of acquisition strategy. Chapter III
provides a discussion, from a theoretical perspective, of
the characteristics of an acquisition strategy and the
constraints and limitations which need to be considered. In
Chapter IV, the realities of acquisition strategy develop-
ment in the major systems acquisition environment are
discussed. Chapter V develops a methodology which could be
used by a PM in the development of an acquisition strategy
at program initiation and describes how this methodology
could be tailored to fit a particular systems acquisition.
11
Finally, Chapter VI provides the conclusions and recommenda-
tions developed as a result of this study, provides answers
to the research questions, and provides recommendations for
further study.
12
II. FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND
A. THE MAJOR SYSTEMS ACQUISITION PROCESS
The acquisition of major systems by the Department of
Defense is a complex process which takes place in a dynamic
environment. Technological, legal, fiscal, political and
institutional forces have molded the process and changed its
nature and direction on a continuous basis. The process, as
we know it today, emerged as a result of a study by the Blue
Ribbon Defense Panel in 1970 and the issuance of DoD
Directive 5000.1 in 1971. The process was further refined
in 1976 by Office of Management and Budget (0MB) Circular
A- 109, Major System Acquisitions (1976). These documents
laid the groundwork on which subsequent directives and
instructions issued by the DoD and the military services
were based. One of the key policies contained in A-109 is
the requirement to tailor an acquisition strategy for each
program and to refine the strategy as the program proceeds
through the acquisition process [Ref. 2:p. 5],
The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), assisted by the
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), guides
and controls the major system acquisition process by a
series of acquisition phases, milestone reviews and decision
points. Figure 2.1 contains a graphic representation of the
major systems acquisition process. The primary goal of the
process is to focus management attention on the critical
events, milestones and decision-points in the development
and production of a major system.
The major systems acquisition process commences with the
identification of a deficiency in an existing capability, a
decision to establish new capabilities, a significant
13
opportunity to reduce the DoD cost of ownership, or in
response to a change in national defense policy [Ref. l:p.
4].
Once a requirement is identified, the military service
prepares a Justification for Major System New Start (JMSNS)
to document the deficiency (or opportunity for improve-
ments). In addition to addressing these issues, the JMSNS
must provide a summary of the major elements of the proposed
acquisition strategy. The JMSNS is submitted with the
Service's Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) for the year
in which funds are requested. The SECDEF approves the JMSNS
in a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) which validates the
requirement and authorizes entrance into the Concept
Exploration (CE) Phase.
One of the first tasks faced by a PM at the initiation
of a program is the development of an acquisition strategy
which sets forth the objectives, resources, management
assumptions, extent of competition, proposed contract types,
program structure, and tailors the prescribed steps in the
major acquisition decision-making process to this strategy
[Ref. l:p. 2]. Once approved, the acquisition strategy
serves as the conceptual framework upon which detailed func-
tional (operational) plans are based. The acquisition
strategy is updated throughout the process and is included
in the program documents which are reviewed and approved at
Milestones I, II, and III.
In the CE Phase, a solicitation, in the form of a
Request for Proposal (RFP), is issued describing the capa-
bility required in mission need terms, not in equipment or
hardware solution terms. Industry responses to the RFP are
evaluated and contracts are awarded to identify and investi-
gate alternative concepts. At the conclusion of the CE
Phase, the PM recommends that one or more of the most prom-



























































Validation (D&V) Phase. This recommendation is made in the
Systems Concept Paper (SCP) which summarizes the results of
the CE Phase [Ref. 4:p. 4]. Among other issues, the SCP
describes the general strategy for the entire program and
provides a detailed strategy for the D&V Phase. Approval of
the SCP by the SECDEF provides authority to proceed with the
D&V phase [Ref. l:p. 4]. This decision-point is represented
by Milestone I in Figure 2.1.
During the Demonstration and Validation Phase, alterna-
tive concepts are developed and validated to determine which
concept (or concepts) should proceed into the Full Scale
Development (FSD) Phase. The decision to proceed into the
FSD Phase is made by the SECDEF and is represented by
Milestone II in Figure 2.1. The decision is based on a
review of the Decision Coordinating Paper/Integrated Program
Summary (DCP/IPS). The DCP expands on the SCP and contains
summary information while the IPS contains more detailed
program data. As part of the DCP, the acquisition strategy
must validate the projected costs and schedule and verify
that they are credible and obtainable [Ref. l:p. 4-1].
The objective during the FSD Phase is to develop a
system that is technologically mature and produceable. ' In
order for a system to move into the Production and
Deployment (P&D) Phase, it must pass a series of development
and operational tests. The decision to enter the P&D Phase
is normally made by the Service Secretary unless the deci-
sion has been retained by the SECDEF. The SECDEF would
retain decision authority if the program had not met estab-
lished performance thresholds or if cost thresholds had been
exceeded. This decision is represented by Milestone III in
Figure 2.1. The decision is made based on a review of the
updated DCP/IPS and includes a detailed review of the
updated acquisition strategy. Completion of the P&D Phase
signifies the end of the major system acquisition process.
16
B. A CONCEPTUAL VIEW OF STRATEGIC PLANNING
Planning is a process that is directed toward producing
one or more future states which are desired and which
are not expected to occur unless something is done.
Planning is thus concerned both with avoiding incorrect
actions and with reducing the frequency of failure to
exploit opportunities. [Ref. 5:p. 3]
Few managers would question the need for planning and
its value in directing and controlling organizations.
Planning is carried out to provide a basis for action
[Ref. 6:p. 104], and generically can be described as a
process that leads to the development of a plan. The ques-
tion facing the program manager in his role as a planner is
not what should be done tomorrow, but rather, what should he
do today in order to be ready for an uncertain tomorrow
[Ref. 7:p. 5].
The planning process has traditionally been subdivided
into two time dimensions, strategic (or long range) planning
and operational (or short range) planning. The distinction
between the two is not always well defined since long range
and short range are relative terms. The perspective
normally adopted is to categorize planning that is broad in
scope, pervasive in its impact and end-oriented (objective-
oriented) as strategic planning. In contrast, short range
planning is typified by detailed goals and plans (i.e.,
means vice ends-oriented), narrowness of scope and short-
sightedness of its coverage. The process is so interre-
lated, however, that a manager must consider both ends of
the planning spectrum together in order to follow the path
to success and survival [Ref. 8:p. 48].
The dilemma facing managers is the articulation of a
strategic plan which provides sufficient direction to subor-
dinates, properly places emphasis on the project as a whole,
and adequately defines the objectives to be strived for yet
17
does not get bogged done in details more suited to func-
tional plans. The danger is to yield to pressures for short
term results at the expense of long term objectives and
goals
.
A key to the planning and decision-making process is the
recognition that a decision made today is not an isolated
event. Each decision made has an impact on other decisions
made or contemplated. It opens up new opportunities and
closes off others whether intentionally or unintentionally.
The optimal situation would be one in which the decision-
maker had perfect knowledge of all of the issues, all
possible combinations of feasible solutions, and a clear
understanding of the consequences of each decision.
Clearly, this type of approach is not realistic.
Many scholars have analyzed and written about the
concept and practice of strategic planning over the last
fifteen years. Most of them approach strategic planning
from a different perspective or differ in their approach.
They all, however, have many ideas in common. Examples
include (1) the need for the development of a long range
strategy, (2) the communication of this strategy to individ-
uals within the organization, (3) the requirement to update
and revise the strategy periodically, and (4) the assertion
that short range functional plans cannot be meaningfully
developed and integrated without first establishing a
comprehensive long range strategy. Although most of the
literature reviewed for this study concerned strategic plan-
ning in the commercial marketplace, it is believed the
concepts developed are equally applicable to the major
systems acquisition process.
An approach to strategic planning frequently taken is to
distinguish between different levels of objectives and
strategies and the manner in which they are developed. One
such approach [Ref. 9:p. 50], describes a process whereby
18
the objectives and strategy of one level are inter-twined
with the objectives and strategy of the next level. This










Source: Adapted from [Ref. 9:p. 51] and [Ref. 10:pp. 27-29]
Figure 2.2 The Hierarchy of Objectives and Strategies.
In addition to the hierarchy approach, they propose that
objectives and strategies are developed either through (1) a
bottom up approach, (2) a top down approach, (3) an interac-
tive or negotiated approach, or (4) by a semi-autonomous (or
relatively independent) approach [Ref. 9
:
pp . 74-76].
If this planning hierarchy was related to the major
systems acquisition process, the following relationships
would result
:
Higher level Strategies -- Corporate level Strategy
Individual Program Strategy -- Business level Strategy
Functional Area Strategy -- Functional Area Strategy
19
These relationships are based on the degree to which
policies are developed and implemented, and the latitude
available to the decision-maker. The hierarchy of purposes,
objectives, and strategies are interdependent. That is, the
strategy developed at the functional level is dependent upon
the strategy developed at higher levels. This interdepen-
dency can, however, have a detrimental effect on the number
and kinds of alternatives available.
For example, at the program level, the PM must take as
given certain policies and procedures mandated by higher
levels when developing his strategy. These policies and
procedures may eliminate options the PM would have otherwise
considered in the development of his acquisition strategy.
Strategic planning, then, can be described as a process
which results in a series of decisions. These decisions
form the objectives and goals of the organization, shape the
major policies, and allocate resources toward the attainment
of these objectives, goals and policies. The process,
ideally, is an inter-weaving of many issues and results in a
strategy which is consistent, achieveable and understand-
able. The ultimate goal of strategic planning is to formu-
late, disseminate and implement a series of objectives,
policies and resource allocations which will allow the
organization to achieve its intended purpose. The planning
process should result in specific end products (i.e., plans)
which will serve as the basis for project direction and as a
blueprint for project execution [Ref. 6:p. 109]. An organi-
zation without a strategy is like a ship without a rudder,
going around in circles [Ref. ll:p. 37].
The actual process of developing strategic plans is as
varied as the number of authors on the subject. A typical
approach to strategy formulation is provided by Hofer and
Schendeland [Ref. 10] which is outlined below and illus-
trated in Figure 2.3. They describe a series of seven steps
in the formulation process. These steps are:
20
1. Strategy identification . An assessment of the organ-
ization's current strategy and strategic components.
2. Environmental analysis . The assessment of the organ-
ization's specific competitive and more general envi-
ronments to identify the major opportunities and
threats facing the organization.
3. Resource analysis . The assessment of the principal
skills and resources available to close the strategic
gaps identified in step 4.
4. Gap analysis . A comparison of the organization's
objectives, strategy, and resources against the
opportunities and threats in its environments to
determine the extent of change required in the
current strategy.
5. Strategic alternatives . Identify the strategic
options upon which the strategy may be built.
6. Strategy evaluation . An evaluation of the strategic
options in terms of the values and objectives of the
shareholders, management, and other relevant power
sources and stakeholders; the resources available;
and the environmental opportunities and threats that
exist in order to identify those that best satisfy
all these demands
.
7. Strategic choice . The selection of one or more of
the strategic options for implementation.
[Ref. 10:p. 47]
The actual mechanics of developing a strategy largely
depend on the skill levels of the planners involved, the
market position of the firm, the resources available, and
the level at which the strategy is being devised. The
corporate strategic planning literature focuses on
describing the different types of strategies (e.g., growth,
market, retrenchment, etc.), organizing for strategic plan-
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Strategic decision-making involves subjective evalua-
tions which requires the process to be tailored to the
organization and the decision-maker involved. During the
research effort, a cookbook type approach utilizing objec-
tive evaluation criteria was not found. Because of its
subjective nature, strategy development can be described as
an organizational process, in many ways inseparable from the
structure, behavior and culture of the organization in which
it takes place [Ref. 12:p. 97]. In the final analysis, the
strategy is the conceptual glue that binds the diverse
activities of a complex organization together [Ref. 13 :p.
18].
C. DEFINITIONS
Acquisition planning, acquisition strategy and acquisi-
tion plans have been defined in a number of ways over the
years and a clear consensus was not found in the major
systems acquisition literature. Accordingly, for the
purpose of this research effort, the following definitions
have been adopted.
1 . Acquisition Planning
Acquisition planning is the continuous process of
analyzing technical, business and management aspects of the
developing system. The planning process first leads to the
generation of a comprehensive acquisition strategy.
[Ref. 14:p. 8]
Acquisition planning can be viewed as analogous to
planning in its broadest sense. It includes both strategic
and operational planning considerations and results in the
development of an acquisition strategy and ultimately in the
development of operational (functional) plans (e.g., Test






The acquisition strategy is the conceptual basis of
the Program Manager's overall plan for satisfying the
mission need in the most effective, economical, and timely
manner [Ref. 15: p. 34-1]. The strategy evolves through an
iterative process which coincides with the development of
the system. Initially broad in scope, it becomes increas-
ingly more refined as the system approaches production and
deployment
.
The acquisition strategy is the conceptual framework
upon which functional plans are based. It is the overall
game plan for the acquisition and deals with broad concepts,
objectives, and assumptions made in the planning process.
The details of how these overall concepts are integrated
into the proposed program are contained in the Acquisition
Plan and in other functional plans.
3 Functional Plans
a. Acquisition Plan
The Acquisition Plan documents the decisions
made in the development of the Acquisition Strategy. It
integrates all of the technical, business, management, and
other significant actions which must be completed during the
course of the acquisition and becomes increasingly more
detailed as the acquisition progresses. In addition to
documenting the major objectives and policies established in
the Acquisition Strategy, the Acquisition Plan summarizes
and integrates information found in more detail in other
functional/operational plans.
b. Other Functional Plans
Other functional/operational plans build upon
the strategy and the Acquisition Plan. They formally
24
document definitive actions which must be accomplished
during the various phases of the acquisition cycle in
particular functional areas. The plans must be specific
with respect to near term goals, and must identify when
actions on longer term goals and objectives must be defini-
tized. In addition, they must be consistent with and
support the objectives and policies found in the Acquisition
Strategy and Acquisition Plan. In short, they constitute
the detailed plans for implementing specific portions of the
acquisition strategy. Examples of functional plans include
the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), and Integrated
Logistics Support Plan (ILSP).
Given these definitions, program management in
the major systems acquisition process could be categorized
as a process where the program manager is continually plan-
ning, revising and updating his program's strategy and
updating and definitizing his functional/operational plans.
This building block process is depicted in Figure 2.4.




Key: ILSP Integrated Logistics Support Plan
TEMP Test and Evaluation Master Plan
SEMP Systems Engineering Master Plan
Other Other Functional Plans
Source: The Researcher
Figure 2.4 The Acquisition Planning Process.
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D. EVOLUTION OF ACQUISITION STRATEGY
The concept of acquisition strategy first gained promi-
nence in the major systems acquisition process during the
1970' s. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (1970) and the
Commission on Government Procurement (1972) both recognized
a need for better procurement planning in their studies.
During this same period, then Deputy Secretary of Defense
Packard formulated planning guidance which ultimately was
published as DoD Instruction 5000.1 in 1971. The need for
better planning was reinforced in 1976 by 0MB Circular A-109
and in various directives and instructions issued by the
individual services
.
The term acquisition strategy was generally used to
describe the overall planning for a program although this
was not a universally accepted convention. Emphasis on
better planning in recent years has resulted in a number of
research efforts in the acquisition strategy development and
implementation area. In addition, the services have issued
a number of directives and instructions designed to refine
the strategy development process.
Over the last fifteen years, a number of studies have
attempted to define and describe acquisition strategy devel-
opment and implementation. One study, [Ref. 16], traced the
evolution of acquisition strategy in the major systems
acquisition process from the 1950's through the late 1970's.
One of the conclusions reached by this study was that a
program's acquisition strategy was the integrating mechanism
which coordinated the widely dispersed activities in the
acquisition process [Ref. 16:p. 129].
Other studies have analyzed individual elements of the
acquisition strategy development and implementation process.
Findings of these studies include methodologies to reduce
the probability of cost growth [Ref. 17] and [Ref. 18],
26
restructuring the planning and documentation process
[Ref. 14], and planning for and managing competition in the
implementation phase [Ref. 19] and [Ref. 20]. The result of
these studies has been an increased awareness of the impor-
tance of strategic planning as a tool in the management and
control of a major systems acquisition program.
E . SUMMARY
This chapter has provided an overview of the major
systems acquisition process, a discussion of strategic plan-
ning and outlined the evolution of acquisition strategy. In
addition, a number of terms were defined and described. In
the researcher's view, development of an acquisition
strategy in the major systems acquisition environment has
many features similar to business level strategy development
in the commercial sector. One such similarity is the need
to incorporate the policies, procedures and strategy of
higher levels when considering the options available to the
PM or other business level strategy formulator.
Effective long range strategic planning in the major
systems acquisition process results in successful programs.
Failure to adequately apply the principles of strategic
planning can result in a program which does not meet its
performance requirements, is not delivered on time and costs
significantly more than planned.
27
III. FORMULATING THE ACQUISITION STRATEGY :
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. INTRODUCTION
There are many issues and factors that affect the formu-
lation of an acquisition strategy. The business environ-
ment, congressional involvement and interest, emerging
technologies, new initiatives, laws and regulations and a
host of others. The program manager must consider all of
these issues as well as make provisions for future issues
and initiatives when he formulates his program's acquisition
strategy
.
The basic objective of the program manager is to field a
system which will satisfy the assigned mission need, and be
delivered on schedule and at a reasonable cost. How well he
accomplishes this objective will, to a large degree, be
determined by the effectiveness of his program's acquisition
strategy
In this chapter, the principal characteristics of an
acquisition strategy will be identified and discussed. In
addition, the major constraints and limitations faced by the
PM during the acquisition strategy formulation process will
be presented. This discussion will be from a theoretical
perspective with the realities involved in the process
deferred until the next chapter.
The information presented in this Chapter and in Chapter
IV is the result of interviews conducted during the research
effort and a review of available literature.
28
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF AN ACQUISITION STRATEGY
1 . Responsive
The first, and possibly the most important, charac-
teristic of an acquisition strategy is its responsiveness to
the mission need for which the program was approved. The
strategy must serve as the overall plan for satisfying the
ultimate objectives of the program which are to meet an
operational need, at a reasonable cost and in a timely
manner. An acquisition strategy which does not adequately
address the mission requirements imposed by the threat for
which the program was initiated can never be successful.
In addition to being responsive to the approved
mission need, the acquisition strategy must satisfy the
concerns of many individuals and organizations within and
external to the particular service involved. Examples
include other services, the DoD , the OMB, the Congress and
possibly the State Department if foreign sales are involved.
These concerns could include funding profiles, initial oper-
ating capability (IOC) date, interfaces with other programs
or existing systems, the degree of competition proposed, the
use of warranties and possibly many others.
In order to be responsive to the needs of these
organizations, the PM must be aware of what their require-
ments are. The PM must know what the objectives, priori-
ties, and policies are in order for him to effectively
formulate an acquisition strategy which will address their
concerns. Failure of the PM to adequately address these
concerns will result in an acquisition strategy which will
require major revisions as it proceeds through the review
process. These revisions will ultimately delay the program
and confuse those individuals responsible for drafting func-
tional strategies and plans.
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In being responsive to higher level concerns the
acquisition strategy cannot, however, address every possible
issue. It also cannot address the level of detail that some
higher level individuals may desire. The objective should
be to identify their concerns and incorporate them into the
acquisition strategy formulation process. A more detailed
discussion will be contained in the functional plans.
2 . Realistic
A second important characteristic of an acquisition
strategy is that it must be realistic. The acquisition
strategy must realistically address such issues as technical
and cost risk, approved funding levels, directed concepts or
inter/ intraoperability requirements as well as any other
constraints or limitations. For example, if competition
throughout the development and production of the system is
desired, adequate funding to accomplish this must be identi-
fied. Failure of the acquisition strategy to be realistic
will cause severe problems in the implementation phase and
will probably result in program objectives not being
achieved
.
A second element to be considered is the stage of
the acquisition process that the program is currently in.
The level and amount of detail expected in the acquisition
strategy should be commensurate with the stage of the acqui-
sition involved. At program initiation, for example, many
of the individual details have not yet been developed.
Accordingly, little information is available on which to
base decisions. As the program progresses toward production
and deployment, greater detail can be expected. Expecting
large amounts of detail at program initiation is unrealistic
because it would cause premature decisions to be made which
would unnecessarily restrict future options. For example,
at program initiation the PM cannot realistically be
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expected to identify in great detail the specific contract
type to be used during the production phase. Requiring him
to do so would unnecessarily restrict the options available





The acquisition strategy must address the major
issues which will impact on the success of the program. It
must, however, consider the program as a whole and not get
bogged down in too much detail more suited to functional
plans. This is especially true with the acquisition
strategy developed at program initiation.
In achieving the goal of being comprehensive, many
complex issues will need to be resolved. The strategy,
however, cannot possibly cover every issue which will arise
in the course of the acquisition. The objective should be
to identify the pertinent issues and how they relate to each
other, not necessarily provide all of the answers. The
strategy should set the stage for integrating the multitude
of complex issues which will be addressed in greater detail
in the functional plans. The actual resolution of problem
areas and the details of how the issues will be integrated
should be covered in the operational/ functional plans. In
order for the functional plans to adequately address these
issues, however, the general framework, policies, and prior-
ities must be established in the acquisition strategy. In
this regard, it is particularly important for the acquisi-
tion strategy to establish priorities among the many acqui-
sition objectives.
4. Integrated and Internally Consistent
Another important characteristic, and one frequently
overlooked, is that the acquisition strategy must integrate
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and interrelate dozens of issues. In doing so, the strategy
must be consistent in its treatment of issues and must not
provide conflicting direction. For example, if breakout of
spare parts during the deployment phase is desired, adequate
provision must be made in the design phase for rights to the
technical data required to achieve this goal. One of the
most difficult tasks in this respect is the resolution of
conflicts between objectives and coping with conflicting
pressures. Each objective in the acquisition strategy
should be mutually supportive, or at the very least, not be
in conflict with each other. Establishing priorities early
in the program assists in this regard.
In order for the acquisition strategy to achieve
internal consistency, the same assumptions must be used
throughout the formulation process. In addition, the same
assumptions and priorities used in developing the acquisi-
tion strategy must be used in developing functional strat-
egies and plans. If this is not accomplished, individual
functional plans will contradict each other and lead to
unnecessary confusion during the implementation phase.
5 . Flexible
The acquisition strategy must be flexible and thus
able to respond to changes in economic, political, techno-
logical and other foreseeable as well as unpredictable
changes in program emphasis and direction. This flexi-
bility, however, should not cause the strategy to be so
general that it negates its value as a planning and manage-
ment tool. Unexpected changes to the funding profile,
delivery dates, test schedule or unforseen technical diffi-
culties could adversely affect the entire program.
Accordingly, contingent strategies must be developed and
incorporated as part of the acquisition strategy so that the
effects of changes in program direction can be mitigated.
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In the early stages of the acquisition, the PM needs
to keep as many options open as possible and recognize that
any decision made impacts on the types of alternatives that
will be available later. The range of options left open
helps determine the amount of flexibility available to the
PM in the latter stages of the acquisition.
6 . A Formal Agreement
The acquisition strategy should serve as a formal
agreement between the PM and higher authorities. This
formal agreement would identify the objectives of the
program, the associated priorities, and the key management
concepts that will be utilized in the planning and execution
of the program. This type of arrangement serves to reduce
the number of changes made in program direction and helps to
ward off those who would provide direction contrary to the
approved strategy.
In the opinion of one author, securing an early
commitment from senior officals in the DoD and from congres-
sional authorities is essential for a major program start
[Ref. 17:p. 53]. One individual interviewed during the
course of the research indicated that the acquisition
strategy should serve as a consensus of opinion on how the
program should be managed and executed. This consensus
would then result in a formal agreement between the PM and
his superiors. Other individuals interviewed supported this
concept and indicated that it would lead to more program
stability by discouraging those individuals who would
normally "tinker" with the program. Another benefit cited
was opportunity to establish clear objectives and goals by
receiving a mandate from the appropriate decision authority.
In other words, it would establish clear lines of authority
and provide formal approval of the management concepts,
policies, objectives and priorities for the program.
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C. CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS
1. Formal Program Planning Guidance
A PM receives formal program planning guidance in a
number of ways and from many individuals and organizations.
The amount and kinds of guidance provided depends on the
nature of the program, the interest that various individuals
and organizations have in the program, the projected cost of
the program, and the level at which program decisions are
approved. It has not been uncommon in the past for a PM to
receive specific planning guidance from the Congress or from
high level Executive Branch officials. This guidance has
taken the form of directed concepts and sources, restric-
tions on the use of various contract types, competition
goals, test and evaluation procedures, warranty require-
ments, and a host of others. All of these actions impact on
the options available to the PM in the development of his
acquisition strategy.
One of the important documents in the early phases
of a program is the Program Manager's Charter. The Charter
defines the mission of the program, establishes initial
funding levels, assigns the PM as well as establishing any
other objectives or limitations for the program. In many
instances, the charter does not sufficiently detail the
strategy, objectives and priorities of higher levels. This
lack of initial guidance causes the PM to, at times, incor-
rectly assume that certain options are available when in
fact they will not be approved.
In the view of program office personnel interviewed
in the course of this research, it is extremely important
that higher level strategies, objectives and priorities be
clearly articulated at the initiation of a program. If this
is not accomplished, the PM will consider strategic alterna-
tives which could subsequently be rejected.
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In the view of many of those interviewed, one of the
major concerns of the PM at program initiation is dealing
with the number of uncertainties facing his program. One
area of concern frequently cited was the amount of program
guidance provided during the life of a program which could
have, and probably should have been, provided at program
initiation. This unnecessary delay results in a number of
changes in program direction and creates confusion in the
program office.
Another problem frequently cited during the inter-
views was the lack of flexibility built into the acquisition
strategy formulation process. Specifically, the vast number
of directives, instructions, and policies which a PM must
consider, understand and comply with severely limit his
flexibility and the number of strategy options available to
him. The end result is that a PM has a difficult time
determining what the overall policies, priorities, and
strategies are.
2. Informal Program Planning Guidance
Informal program guidance can come in many forms
.
Suggestions by higher level officials, congressional commit-
tees and others serve to limit the options available to the
PM. Additional informal guidance comes from other program
managers who have program management experience and from
individuals who interpret and evaluate compliance with the
policies and procedures of higher levels. The PM also
receives informal guidance during the formal program review
process. During the various reviews, guidance may be
provided which could limit the flexability and options
available to the PM. This guidance may not, however, be




The principal danger with informal guidance is that
it may not be consistent with formal planning guidance
received or may unnecessarily limit the options available to
the PM. In addition, since many individuals involved in the
review process are concerned with a limited portion of the
overall strategy (e.g., funding profile), they may not have
an appreciation for what impact their guidance has on the
overall program or on other program elements. This is
particularly true in the early stages of the acquisition
when numerous alternatives are available.
3 . Economic and Political Pressures
The increasing costs of new systems leads to pres-
sure to keep program costs down. This pressure affects the
types of options available to the PM in the development of
his program's acquisition strategy. If a true Circular
A- 109 approach is contemplated, many short term development
contracts would be used in the concept exploration phase of
the acquisition. This in turn would require a higher level
of front end funding than other approaches. If the PM is
under pressure to keep front end development funding low, he
may not be able to follow a true A-109 approach.
In addition to economic pressures, the PM must
recognize and appreciate the political process and its asso-
ciated pressures on his program. During the budget review
process, various congressional committees will investigate
the missions , funding levels and other aspects of the
program. The interests of the congressional committees may
not, necessarily, match those of the PM or the DoD. Chapter
IV provides expanded treatment of the effects of political




The accelerating rate of change in both military and
industrial technology makes it particularly difficult to
predict the future in detail [Ref. 16:p. 20]. Often, tech-
nical considerations become the overriding concern of
personnel responsible for managing and reviewing program
progress. The PM's objective should be to strike a balance
between technical requirements, program funding, schedule
considerations as well as many other issues.
The identification and categorization of all of the
technical issues which will need to be resolved during the
life of the program cannot possibly be addressed in the
early stages of the program. The objective at program
initiation should be to identify the types of issues which
need to be addressed, the methodology to be used to address
them and the stage of the acquisition process when they must
be considered. In the acquisition objectives developed at
program initiation, the PM should identify the major tech-
nical issues to be resolved during the development and
production phases. The technical complexity, degree of risk
involved, and the impact of critical technical setbacks




There is constant pressure to reduce the time it
takes to acquire and field new systems. If an Initial
Operating Capability (IOC) date has been provided in the
Program Charter, the strategy options available to the PM
become restricted. This emphasis on reducing acquisition
time is contained in DoD Directive 5000.1 which lists a
primary goal of the acquisition strategy as minimizing the
time it takes to acquire material and facilities to satisfy
military needs [Ref. l:p. 6].
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Other scheduling requirements have an impact on the
development of a programs acquisition strategy. These
include the scheduling of test and evaluation activities,
the programming of activities involving different fiscal
years or types of funds (e.g., research and development
versus production funds), and providing for formal program
reviews
.
If a program's acquisition strategy is dominated by
scheduling concerns, many strategy options will be elimi-
nated from consideration. For example, if an inflexible IOC
date is provided, the PM is required to force fit the devel-
opment and production phases of the program into this
schedule despite any associated negative implications.
6 . Resource Limitations
One of the most important factors in determining the
success of a program is the amount and kinds of resources
dedicated to the program. To be successful, a PM needs
capable individuals in the program office, a minimum level
of funding as well as other resources. Examples of other
critical resources include access to Government laboratories
and test facilities, support from higher level headquarters
organizations, engineering support, the use of Government
furnished equipment and material if required, and the avail-
ability of required raw material and production skills.
Close attention is normally given to program funding
because the non-availability of funds usually requires the
reduction of planned efforts in one phase and the resche-
duling of the task for a later date [Ref. 19:pp. 3-5].
Other resources, however, cannot be ignored or overshadowed
by program funding concerns
.
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7 . Risk Management
One of the most difficult aspects of program plan-
ning is the identification, categorization and quantifica-
tion of program risks. There are many risk areas which need
to be considered. Examples include cost, schedule, develop-
ment, the transition from development to production, techno-
logical, and political. One author notes that maintaining a
proper risk sharing relationship between the Government and
its contractors is one of the major components of a sound
acquisition strategy [Ref. 21:p. 37].
In developing the acquisition strategy, the PM
should identify those risk areas which could have an adverse
impact on the success of the program. By identifying known
and suspected risks early, the PM and functional planners
can plan for and devote resources towards reducing these
risks. By developing contingency strategies, the PM might
be able to mitigate the impact that these risks have on the
success of the program.
D . SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a discussion of the major
characteristics of an acquisition strategy and those
constraints and limitations which must be considered in the
acquisition strategy formulation process.
The acquisition strategy formulation process is complex
and influenced by many factors outside the control of the
PM. One key to the process is the identification and
categorization of those issues which need to be considered,
evaluated, reconciled and integrated so as to reduce the
degree of uncertainty and ensure program success.
A second key to the process is the early identification
of higher level strategies, objectives, priorities, and
policies. This is critical to the successful development of
an acquisition strategy at program initiation.
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IV. THE REALITIES OF ACQUISITION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
As discussed in Chapter II, a program's acquisition
strategy is the broad conceptual framework upon which func-
tional strategies and plans are developed. There appears to
be a lack of clear direction, however, in the actual devel-
opment of program acquisition strategies. This uncertainty,
in the view of many individuals interviewed, is partly a
result of incomplete or vague guidance provided in various
program planning documents. In addition, uncertainties in
the political process have a significant effect on program
management and planning.
This chapter will identify and discuss some of the prob-
lems and issues encountered in the development of program
acquisition strategies and the uncertainties that currently
exist in the view of a number of program office personnel.
B. THE PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION PROCESS
Development of an acquisition strategy for each program
is mandated by OMB Circular A- 109 which requires that agen-
cies tailor an acquisition strategy for each program as soon
as the agency decides to solicit alternative system design
concepts [Ref. 2:p. 5]. Circular A-109 does not provide a
definition of acquisition strategy, but does provide a
listing of items which could typically be included in an
acquisition strategy. These items include:
1. Use of the contracting process as an important tool
in the acquisition program;




3. Demonstration, test, and evaluation criteria;
4. Content of solicitations for proposals;
5. Decisions on whom to solicit;
6. Methods for obtaining and sustaining competition;
7. Guidelines for the evaluation and acceptance or
rejection of proposals;
8. Goals for design- to- cost
;
9. Methods for projecting life cycle costs;
10. Use of data rights;
11. Use of warranties;
12. Methods for analyzing and evaluating contractor and
Government risks
;
13. Need for developing contractor incentives;
14. Selection of the type of contract best suited for
each stage in the acquisition process; and
15. Administration of contracts. [Ref. 2:p. 5]
DoD Directive 5000.1 Maj or System Acquisitions and DoD
Instruction 5000.2 Maj or System Acquisition Procedures were
revised to implement the policies contained in Circular
A- 109 and to provide additional guidance. The current
version of DoD Directive 5000.1 (1982) requires that an
acquisition strategy be developed for each major system and
provides details on the incorporation of the strategy in
various program documents. The specific requirements and
documents involved include:
1. Justification For Maj or Systems New Start ( JMSNS )
.
Requires a summary of the salient elements of the
proposed acquisition strategy, such as program struc-
ture, competition, and contracting [Ref. 4:p. 3-1].
2
.
Systems Concept Paper and Decision Coordinating
Paper . These papers require a discussion of the
general strategy for the entire program, and a
detailed strategy for proceeding to the next mile-
stone. In addition, program structure, competition
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and contracting for all phases must be addressed.
The papers must outline production planning to ensure
an industrial base response that will support effi-
cient manufacture and provide surge capacity, when
appropriate. At milestone II, the PM must discuss
cost control and verify that future costs and
schedule are defined in detail and are credible. He
must also indicate those DoD Directives, DoD
Instructions, and Management principles which will
not be applied to the proposed system. [Ref. 4:p.
4-1]
3. Integrated Program Summary . Requires a description
of the current strategy to acquire and deploy the
system to satisfy the mission need [Ref. 4:p. 5-2].
In addition to the requirements imposed by the DoD and
higher levels, the individual services and their subordinate
organizations have imposed additional requirements. These
requirements include expanded coverage of certain topics and
a more detailed discussion of selected issues.
Each of the services have issued directives- and instruc-
tions which implement and expand upon the requirements
established by the DoD and higher levels. These imple-
menting documents establish many service specific require-
ments or procedures, detail the in-service review and
approval process , and expand upon the requirements for and
the content of acquisition strategies and functional plans.
In addition to the directives and instructions issued by
the OMB, the DoD and the individual services, the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) [Ref. 15] provides guidance on
the preparation of acquisition strategies and acquisition
plans. The FAR, in Part 34, requires a PM to develop an
acquisition strategy tailored to the particular major system
involved. It goes on to state that the strategy shall
qualify as the acquisition plan if written in accordance
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with the requirements of Subpart 7.1 (Acquisition Plans)
[Ref. 15 :p. 34-1]. Subpart 7.1 provides detailed guidance
on the preparation of acquisition plans and lists a number
of issues which must be addressed. The issues range from
life-cycle cost considerations to the selection of contract
type for each contract contemplated. Appendix C provides a
listing of these requirements.
The FAR, in Part 34, describes the acquisition strategy
as the conceptual basis of the program manager's overall
plan [Ref. 15:p. 34-1]. In Subpart 7.1, however, the acqui-
sition strategy can qualify as the acquisition plan if
written in sufficient detail. If an acquisition strategy
can qualify as an acquisition plan, the distinction made
between broad concepts and detailed plans becomes unclear.
The acquisition strategy, if written following the guide-
lines for the preparation of acquisition plans, may become
too detailed and not useful as an overall program planning
document. In other words, a PM may become so overwhelmed by
the many details of program planning that he may loose sight
of the broad perspective. If this occurs, many strategy
alternatives may be erroneously eliminated as a result of
decisions made on individual details. The end result would
be an undue emphasis on detailed functional plans before the
concepts on which these plans should be based are
formulated
.
A second document which contributes to the difficulty in
distinguishing between acquisition strategies and acquisi-
tion plans is the DoD FAR Supplement. In Subpart 7.1 it
states that:
The program manager, or other official responsible for
the program, has (the) overall responsibility for requi-
site acquisition planning as (he does) for all other
planning for the program. The contracting officer or
the contracting officer's designee shall support this
offic '
plan
cial by preparing and maintaining the acquisition
[Ref. 22:p. 7.1-1]
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The language used implies that the acquisition plan falls
primarily in the domain of the contracting officer. In
doing so, the implication is that the acquisition plan could
more appropriately be titled the Contracting Plan. Although
the contracting officer is involved in many aspects of
program planning, he cannot be expected to have the broad
view that the PM is required to have.
The responsibility for preparing the acquisition
strategy, because of its broad and pervasive nature, should
not be delegated below the PM level. Since it is the
overall game plan and the basis for all other planning, it
should be developed by the PM with assistance from func-
tional specialists. One of the functional specialists
involved is the contracting officer.
C. THE PROGRAM REVIEW PROCESS
During the program review process, the program's acqui-
sition strategy is scrutinized by many individuals and
organizations who are interested in different facets of the
acquisition. For example, organizations interested in the
logistic supportability of the proposed system review the
acquisition strategy to ensure that logistic issues are
adequately addressed and conform to established policies and
thresholds. In other words, the PM must satisfy many organ-
izations and individuals whose interests may be narrow in
scope and who may not be able to appreciate the overall
strategy for the program. As a result, there are many indi-
viduals who can say "no" to a particular portion of the
acquisition strategy. There are few individuals, however,
who can "yes" to the overall strategy.
A PM faces many formal, as well as informal, reviews
during the life of the program. Formal major system program
reviews are normally conducted by the Defense Systems
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Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) at Milestones I, II and
III (if a SECDEF decision is required). Before reaching
this review level, however, virtually every level in the
PM's chain of command conducts a formal review of the
program. These levels could include System/ Commodity
Commands and Service level reviews (e.g., Department of the
Navy Systems Acquisition Review Council (DNSARC)).
In addition to these formal reviews , a number of
informal reviews take place. These include program status
briefings, budget reviews, functional plan reviews, as well
as any others deemed appropriate. This layering of formal
and informal reviews stretches out the decision-making
process and consumes a major portion of the PMs time and
effort. One individual interviewed estimated that the
typical PM spends 75% of his time preparing for or attending
program reviews and briefings. In addition to the PMs time
and effort, a significant portion of the resources available
in the program office are devoted to these reviews. The
impact is that more resources may be devoted to preparing
for and attending reviews and briefings , defending program
decisions, and responding to queries from higher levels than
are devoted to developing and implementing strategic and
operational plans.
One of the problems faced by a PM in the development of
his acquisition strategy at program initiation is the struc-
ture and timing of the review process. The first acquisi-
tion strategy prepared for the program is contained in the
Justification for Major Systems New Start (JMSNS). Since
the PM is not normally assigned until after the program has
been approved (i.e., JMSNS approval), he probably did not
participate in the development of the JMSNS or in the asso-
ciated decision-making process. During the development,
review and approval of the JMSNS, many decisions will be
made which will impact on the number and types of alterna-
tives which will be available to the PM.
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The next time the acquisition strategy is formally
reviewed by the DSARC is at the Milestone I review. In the
interim, the PM has developed, obtained approval of and
began implementing his acquisition strategy during which a
period of months or years may have elapsed. Although this
strategy has been reviewed and approved at some intermediate
level, the ultimate review body (the DSARC or service equiv-
alent) and the ultimate decision-maker (the SECDEF or
Service Secretary) may not be fully aware of the contents of
the acquisition strategy.
If a portion of the acquisition strategy is disapproved
at the Milestone I review, a major change in program direc-
tion and major revisions to the acquisition strategy may be
required. An example of this was provided by an individual
interviewed during the research. He related a situation in
which a program's acquisition strategy required major revi-
sions as a result of significant reductions in the funding
available to the program. Since the Concept Exploration
Phase has been virtually completed by this point, changes to
the acquisition strategy may require that certain events in
the Phase be redone. The revisions could also be so
dramatic that the entire acquisition strategy might have to
be reformulated from scratch. This in turn would also
require major revisions to the functional strategies and
plans
.
In the view of the majority of individuals interviewed,
the PM is placed in a difficult position as a result of the
review and approval process. This is particularly true if
the PM was not part of the decision-making process early in
the life of the program. Those expressing this opinion felt
that the overall framework for the program had already been
developed before the PM had the opportunity to develop his
acquisition strategy. As a result, they questioned the
viability and validity of having the PM develop the
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program's acquisition strategy. In addition, they viewed
the PM's role as one of implementing the overall strategy
developed by higher levels and developing and implementing
strategies to achieve specific objectives and goals. In
this case, the PM would become a business level strategy
formulator as discussed in Chapter II. This arrangement,
in their opinion, would more accurately reflect the duties
and responsibilities of the individuals concerned and the
decision authority available to each.
D. THE POLITICAL PROCESS
The development of an acquisition strategy at program
initiation, and the maintenance of it thereafter, can be
significantly influenced by political concerns. This influ-
ence can be the result of hearings held by the Congress,
guidance provided in Defense Authorization or Appropriation
Bills, or initiatives taken by Congressional Committees or
officials in the Executive Branch. In addition, the acqui-
sition strategy may be affected by other political consider-
ations. These could include: concern about the size, scope,
or cost of the program; the environmental impact of the
proposed technology; the general political climate relative
to the overall level of defense expenditures; the state of
the economy; the condition and location of potential prime
and subcontractors; the concerns of special interest groups;
proposed basing schemes; and possibly many others. It has
not been uncommon in the past for program decisions to be
influenced more by the political process than by efficiency
or effectiveness concerns. The B-l Bomber and the MX
Missile programs are examples of the impact that the polit-
ical process can have [Ref. 23] and [Ref. 24].
To be successful, the PM must appreciate the impact that
the political process can have on his program. He must be
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able to assess the current political environment as well as
attempt to predict what it will be like in the future. He
must be able to gauge the political ramifications of each
strategy option considered as well the likelihood of its
acceptance. If a PM does not appreciate and make allowances
for political considerations, significant setbacks in the
program are likely.
E. THE MAJOR SYSTEMS PLANNING ENVIRONMENT
One of the principal requirements for effective stra-
tegic planning, according to many authors, is the need for a
long range planning environment within an organization.
This planning environment encourages long range planning as
a means of attaining organizational objectives.
A majority of the individuals interviewed asserted that
in the major systems acquisition process, there is a
tendency to concentrate on near term events at the expense
of long range considerations. The need for better long
range planning was reinforced in an announcement by
Secretary of Defense Weinberger on 30 April 1981. In a
charter of acquisition principles designed to reduce the
costs of systems and improve the acquisition process, he
stated that in order for us to improve program stability, we
must improve our long range planning [Ref. 25:p. 13]. This
statement by the senior official in the DoD is an example of
t" s concern over the quality of our long range planning.
Acquisition strategy development is, by definition,
concerned with long range planning.
In order for the development of an acquisition strategy
to be successful, especially at program initiation, the PM
must have the support of all levels in the DoD. Adequate
resources must be made available, the strategy and objec-
tives of higher levels must be clearly articulated, and
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emphasis must be placed on the importance of the acquisition
strategy. This emphasis would translate into better up
front planning and contribute to the success of the program.
If emphasis is not placed on long range planning, the devel-
opment and maintenance of an acquisition strategy will
become an meaningless exercise.
F . SUMMARY
This chapter has identified and discussed some of the
realities involved in the acquisition strategy formulation
process. The program documentation and review process and
political concerns impact heavily on the options available
to the PM in the development of his acquisition strategy.
The combination of these concerns has resulted in a large
degree of uncertainty and ineffectiveness at the PM level
and has lead to inefficiencies in major systems acquisition
process
.
A second major issue presented was the need for a long
range planning environment (or culture) in the major systems
acquisition process. In order for the acquisition strategy
to be an effective management tool, appropriate emphasis
must be placed on long-range planning and its contribution
to program success.
A question raised by the majority of those individuals
interviewed was the validity of having the PM develop the
program's acquisition strategy. Most felt that it would be
more appropriate for the PM to develop strategies and plans
for implementing the overall strategy and objectives of
higher levels. They suggested that this arrangement would
more accurately reflect the duties and responsibilities of
the individuals concerned and the decision authority avail-
able to each.
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V. A METHODOLOGY FOR ACQUISITION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
AT PROGRAM INITIATION
A. GENERAL
As discussed in previous chapters, there is a recognized
need for better long range planning in the major systems
acquisition process. This need is particularly critical at
the initiation of a program. The vehicle used to effect
this long range planning is the development of an acquisi-
tion strategy for the program.
The development of a program's acquisition strategy at
program initiation is a long range planning process which
will impact on virtually every event in the course of the
acquisition. Decisions made early in the process will
determine the direction the program will take, which alter-
natives will be pursued, and which options will be elimi-
nated from consideration. Because of the uncertainties
inherent in the process, the PM can never expect to have
perfect knowledge of all combinations of feasible solutions
and a clear understanding of the consequences of each deci-
sion made.
The answer to this planning dilemma, in part, is to
dedicate appropriate resources to the formulation and imple-
mentation of the program's acquisition strategy. Examples
include assigning the prospective PM during the formulation
of the JMSNS and the assignment of capable individuals to
the program office. The objective of the PM should be to
carefully, and as completely as possible, plan for the
development, test, production, and support of the proposed
system as early in the life of the program as possible.
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The purpose of this chapter is to propose a methodology
for the formulation of an acquisition strategy at program
initiation. This methodology is based on the concepts
described in Chapters II and III, and the realities involved
in the process discussed in Chapter IV.
B. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
The development of an acquisition strategy is a problem
solving and resource allocation process which, if properly
conducted, will result in an acquisition strategy which has
the characteristics outlined in Chapter III. The method-
ology proposed is based on answering the five questions
normally used in the planning or decision-making process.
These questions are:
1. What is to be accomplished?
2. Why must it be accomplished?
3. Who is responsible for accomplishing it?
4. When is the requirement to be satisfied?
5. How is the requirement to be satisfied?
The acquisition strategy, if properly developed, will
answer these questions. In particular, the acquisition
strategy will answer the question of how the need will be
satisfied (in strategy terms, not in hardware solution
terms )
.
During the acquisition strategy development process, the
PM needs to be keenly aware of what strategy level he is
operating at when considering a given option. As discussed
in Chapter II, there are three major levels of strategy
formulation. These levels are corporate level, business
level, and functional level. The level at which a given
strategy option is considered is important because it deter-
mines the degree of latitude and flexibility available to
the decision-maker. For example, if a PM can consider
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whether or not competition at the prime contractor level
will be pursued, he is operating at the corporate level.
If, on the other hand, he has been told that he will have
competition, then he is operating at the business level.
Continuing the example cited above, if the PM was told
that he would have competition and that he would use the
Leader-Follower method, then he would be operating at the
functional level. If he was provided with specific details
of how to effect this competition, he would be operating at
a level below the functional level. This example could be
expanded to include any number of possible strategy options.
It is important to consider the level that the PM is
operating at because it impacts on the number, variety and
nature of options available to him. This is true not only
for the option under consideration, but also for all other
strategy options. This is because a decision made in one
area impacts on the number of options available in all other
areas
.
The methodology presented in the following sections
sequentially considers the questions posed at the begining
of this section while also considering the strategy level
the PM is operating at.
C. ANSWERING THE WHO, WHAT, WHEN AND WHY QUESTIONS
The objective during this step is to identify what is to
be accomplished and why, when it must be completed and who






Figure 5.1 Assessing Requirements.
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The answers to some of these questions are outlined in
the Justification for Major Systems New Start (JMSNS) and in
the Program Manager's Charter. The guidelines normally
provided in these two documents are outlined below.
The Justification for Major Systems New Start provides
the following program guidance:
1. The mission need;
.2. The projected threat and the shortfalls of existing
systems in meeting this threat;
3. The timing of the need and the general priority of
the system;
4. Known alternatives which will be considered during
the Concept Exploration Phase;
5. The maturity of the technology which is being pursued
for known alternatives and the remaining risk
involved
;
6. The proposed level of funding;
7. Any known constraints (e.g., standardization, inter-
operability, critical materials, or industrial base
considerations); and
8. A summary of the salient elements of the acquisition
strategy including the proposed program structure,
competition, and contracting. [Ref. 4:p. 3-1]
The Program Manager's Charter expands upon the guidance
provided in the JMSNS and further develops the type of
management approach to be utilized. Although each decision-
authority determines the content of a particular Program
Manager's Charter, it typically provides the guidance
outlined below.
1. Designates the PM;
2. Assigns the mission to be accomplished;
3. Specifies the type of program organization to be used
(e.g., project versus matrix);
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4. Defines the authority and responsibilities of the PM;
and
5. Designates any supporting or participating organiza-
tions .
Since satisfying the mission need is the ultimate objec-
tive of the program, it is the starting point in the process
and determines what is to be accomplished. The projected
threat, and the shortfalls in existing systems in meeting
this threat, answers why the program is required.
The number of alternatives available to the PM is
significantly influenced by the manner in which the mission
need has been identified. For example, if the proposed
system is to interface with an existing system, the design
concepts and number of competitive sources which can respond
to the need may be limited. The general policy of stating
the requirement in mission terms, not in equipment terms, is
contained in OMB Circular A- 109 [Ref. 2:p. 3].
The challenge facing the PM is to state the need in a
manner which does not unnecessarily restrict the number of
options available to him. If the mission need provided by
the JMSNS was stated in equipment terms or in some other
restrictive manner, the PM may not be able to consider
corporate level strategy options. Instead, he will be tied
to business level strategy options which implement the
directed corporate level strategy.
The JMSNS also provides information concerning the
timing of the need and therefore may answer the question of
when the system is required. In addition, the Program
Manager's Charter may elaborate on the timing of the need by
specifying the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) date. The
timing of the requirement has a significant impact on the
kinds of options available to the PM. For example, if a
firm IOC date has been established, the PM may be required
to eliminate certain development or production options from
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consideration. In this case, the PM is operating at a busi-
ness or functional strategy level and cannot consider
options which will not meet the required IOC. The end
result would be a scheduling process where events are sched-
uled based on the IOC date, not on the time it should real-
istically take for each event. These pressures could lead
to concurrent development and production even though there
may be a high level of risk involved. The very process of
planning for concurrency, however, also becomes part of the
PM's strategy at the business and functional levels.
As noted above, the Program Manager's Charter designates
the PM and therefore answers the question of who is respon-
sible for the success of the program. The Charter also
defines his authority and relationship to higher level and
supporting organizations.
D. DETERMINING HOW THE NEED WILL BE SATISFIED
In determining how the need will be satisfied, the PM is
determining what the components of his acquisition strategy
will be. Again, the PM needs to consider what strategy
level he is operating at and what strategy alternatives are
available to him. In order to determine how the need will
be satisfied, the PM first needs to consider what planning
guic nee he has received from higher levels as well as other
external factors which are discussed below. This step is
illustrated in Figure 5.2.
1. Evaluation of External Factors
Before attempting to determine how he plans to
satisfy the mission need, a PM first needs to determine what
external factors need to be considered. In order to gather
the necessary information, the PM will need to investigate a
number of sources. These sources include:
a. Congressional hearings and legislation;
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Higher level Executive Branch documents (e.g.,
Executive Orders, OMB Circulars);
The Federal Acquisition Regulation;
The DoD FAR Supplement;
Applicable directives, instructions, and policy
letters issued by the DoD, and other organizations in
the PM ' s chain of command; and















Figure 5.2 Guidance Determination.
In addition to these formal sources of information,
the PM must be sensitive to informal guidance received and
the overall political climate. These influences were
discussed in Chapters III and IV.
The types of direction provided may include mandated
competition goals, directed sources or concepts, small busi-
ness concerns, warranty provisions, and the type of
contracts to be utilized. The PM ' s objective should be to
identify all of the specific details of how the acquisition
will be accomplished which have been mandated by higher
levels. The PM must consider these details as constraints
and limitations which must be considered and complied with
in the development of his acquisition strategy. The only
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exception to this would be where the PM receives a waiver of
the requirement from the appropriate decision authority.
The problem facing the PM is the assimilation, inte-
gration, and implementation of the planning guidance
received. One of the most difficult tasks in this regard is
ascertaining what are the overall strategy, policies, objec-
tives, and priorities. This will also determine at what
strategy level the PM is operating. These items are
addressed, in varying levels of detail, in each of the docu-
ments cited previously. The fragmentation resulting from
this myriad of documents creates a large amount of uncer-
tainty at the program level which, in turn, makes the
assessment of the overall environmental factors which need
to be considered a long, involved, and complex process.
The degree to which the PM formulates his acquisi-
tion strategy is a function of how much direction he has
received. The more direction that he receives, the less
latitude there is available. The types and amount of
guidance received by the PM determines whether he develops
the program's acquisition strategy or whether he implements
the strategy directed by higher levels.
As discussed in Chapter IV, the majority of those
interviewed believed that the number of constraints and
limitations placed on the PM generally result in a directed
strategy. Consequently, by the time the PM incorporates all
of the guidance received there are very few strategy options
available. If this is the case, the answer to how the
acquisition will be accomplished has been determined. The
difficult task left to the PM is to resolve any conflicts
and to propose, defend, and implement this acquisition
strategy
.
Other external factors which could impact on the
number of options available to the PM include the stability
of the technology involved, the number of prospective
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sources, and the general condition of the industrial base.
These factors can have a significant influence on the
strategy options available to the PM. For example, if the
program involves the use of production processes which are
unique to one firm, there are few competitive options avail-
able to the PM. The limited availability of a critical raw
material would be another example of an external factor
which could severely limit the options available to the PM.
2. Identification and Evaluation of Strategic
Alternatives
Once a PM has identified all of the external factors
which need to be considered, the next step is to identify
and evaluate all of the strategic alternatives available.
This step is illustrated in Figure 5.3. The identification
and evaluation of strategic alternatives is a three step
process and is outlined below.
The first step is to evaluate the impact of the
formal and informal planning guidance and other external
factors previously identified. The result of this evalua-
tion will be a listing of directed concepts, sources, proce-
dures, policies, objectives and priorities. This step is of
critical importance since it determines the range of options
available to the PM and the strategy level at which he is
operating. The requirements placed by higher levels can be
categorized as either hard or soft. Hard requirements are
those which must be complied with and a waiver cannot be
expected. Soft requirements, on the other hand, are those
which are desired but also can be waived if they will have
an adverse impact on the program.
The second step is to identify as many strategic
alternatives as possible. This listing of strategic alter-
natives should not be constrained by the results of step
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possible which could be pursued if the PM was not
constrained in the development of his acquisition strategy.
The third step is to compare the guidance identified
in step one to the strategic alternatives developed in step
two. The result of this comparison will be a listing of
feasible strategic alternatives. Alternatives which cannot
be pursued as a result of constraints or limitations placed
on the PM should be carefully evaluated. The PM may wish to
request a wavier of the requirement or an easing of the
restrictions imposed if appropriate.
E. SELECTING THE STRATEGY TO BE FOLLOWED
Once a PM has identified and evaluated all of the
feasible strategic alternatives available to him, he is
ready to formulate his acquisition strategy. The objective
is to develop the broad concepts to be followed, the major
acquisition objectives to be attained and the general poli-
cies to be followed in the development of functional plans.
The resulting strategy should have the characteristics
described in Chapter III. This step is illustrated in
Figure 5.4.
In the decision-making process, the PM needs to care-
fully consider each strategy option and its impact on all
other options. To accomplish this, the PM needs to conduct
a sensitivity analysis to determine how sensitive a given
alternative is in relation to the assumptions made, risks
identified, and other alternatives. This assessment will
probably be qualitative in nature since the data on which to
conduct a quantitative analysis will normally not be avail-
able. The primary objective of the analysis is to provide
the PM with a degree of confidence that he has considered
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After selecting a strategy, the PM must deal with the
question of what to do with all of the alternatives that
were not selected, and what he will do if for some reason
the selected strategy encounters difficulties. During the
strategy selection process, dozens of decisions were made on
individual alternatives based on assumptions made early in
the process. Prior to finalizing his strategy, the PM needs
to develop contingency strategies which can be invoked if
the conditions on which the assumptions were based change.
Feasible alternatives not selected for incorporation in the
strategy are prime candidates for contingent strategies.
These contingency strategies answer the "what if" questions.
Examples include strategies to be employed if major changes
in program funding occur or if critical technical factors
cannot be achieved. The objective is to provide a degree of
flexibility to the PM in being able to respond to adversity.
Once the strategy has been selected, the next step is to
have it approved by the appropriate decision authority.
This is of critical importance since the acquisition
strategy will serve as a formal agreement between the PM and
the decision authority relative to how the acquisition will
be accomplished. It will also provide clear direction to
subordinates responsible for developing and executing
substrategies and functional plans.
The final question to be answered is whether the contin-
gent strategies developed and the alternatives not selected
in the strategy development process should be included in
the strategy proposed to higher levels. The distinction
made between alternatives not selected and contingent strat-
egies is not always clear. One would expect that an alter-
native not selected which is still feasible would migrate
into the category of contingent strategies. In the view of
the researcher, once an alternative is rejected, it should
become a contingent strategy. The only alternatives which
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do not become contingent strategies are those which are no
longer feasible.
The majority of individuals interviewed believed that
the proposed strategy should not include a detailed discus-
sion of the feasible alternatives not selected. The general
feeling was that rejected alternatives should be mentioned
but a detailed analysis should not be presented. This would
help answer some of the "what if" and "what about" type
questions without allowing the strategy to become too
complex
.
In the view of the researcher, feasible alternatives
which were not selected in the decision making-process
should be included in the proposed strategy. The coverage
should be as brief as possible yet let the reader know the
rationale for the decision. For example, a given alterna-
tive was not selected because the Program Manager's Charter
directed that another alternative would be used. One other
reason for including these alternatives is to document the
guidance, both formal and informal, that the PM has received
and the impact it has had on the decision-making process.
Once an option has been rejected and documented in the
acquisition strategy, it should not be included in subseq-
uent strategies. Otherwise, the strategies submitted well
into the life of the program (e.g., at FSD) would become
cluttered and overly complex. The PM, however, needs to
track the feasible alternatives not selected since he may
have to reconsider them later on in the program. These
feasible alternatives could be considered contingent
strategies
.
Contingent strategies which address major risks and
critical success factors, in the view of the researcher,
should be included in the acquisition strategy submitted at
program initiation. Contingent strategies which do not meet
this criteria, however, should not be included. The reason
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for not including them in the strategy is to keep the
strategy broad in scope and not involved in the identifica-
tion and evaluation of dozens of strategies which would only
be used if some unplanned event were to occur. If ques-
tioned about a particular risk or assumption, the PM would
be able to provide the answer on a case-by-case basis.
F . SUMMARY
This chapter has proposed a general methodology for the
development of an acquisition strategy at program initia-
tion. The heart of the process is the identification and
evaluation of strategic alternatives and their comparison to
planning guidance received. The strategy should serve as
the basis for detailed program planning and guide the devel-
opment of functional plans.
In addition to the strategy selected and proposed to the
decision authority, the PM has developed contingent strat-
egies which can be invoked if assumptions made early in the
planning process turn out to be invalid. These strategies
will assist the PM in responding to changing conditions and
program redirections.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions were developed as a result of
this research effort
:
1. There is not a clear distinction between the acquisi -
tion strategy and the acquisition plan . As discussed
in Chapter IV, Section B, there is not a clear
distinction made between the acquisition strategy and
the acquisition plan in existing regulations, direc-
tives, and instructions. The FAR describes the
acquisition strategy as the conceptual basis for the
program while also stating that the acquisition
strategy qualifies as the acquisition plan if written
in sufficient detail. Accordingly, the distinction
made between broad concepts and detailed plans




The latitude available to the PM in the development
of his acquisition strategy is highly limited . A
significant portion of the acquisition strategy
formulation process is driven by detailed planning
guidance provided to the PM. As discussed in Chapter
IV, the PM is provided with a tremendous amount of
formal and informal planning guidance. This guidance
restricts the options available to the PM and serves
to limit his ability to develop an acquisition
strategy for the program. The result is that the PM
ends up implementing the fragmented strategy directed
by higher levels instead of developing a comprehen-
sive, integrated strategy tailored to his program.
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priorities of higher levels are not clear or effec -
tively communicated to the PM . One of the first
steps in formulating an acquisition strategy is the
identification of the overall strategy, policies,
objectives, and priorities of higher levels. In
order to accomplish this, the PM must look to dozens
of program planning documents and try to determine
what affect they have on his program. A document
does not exist which clearly articulates the overall
strategy and objectives of higher levels or assigns
priorities to the many objectives involved in the
major systems acquisition process. The end result is
that the PM must sort out what the overall strategy
and policies are and what affect they will have on
his program.
4. A long range planning environment does not exist in
the maj or systems acquisition process . As noted in
Chapter IV, Section E, there is a recognized need for
better long range planning in the major systems
acquisition process but there does not appear to be a
planning environment or culture to support this need.
There appears to be more emphasis on short range
planning considerations and day-to-day operations
than on long range strategic planning. This is espe-
cially true at the initiation of a program.
5
.
Feasible alternatives not selected for inclusion in
the acquisition strategy should become contingent
strategies . The feasible alternatives which were not
included in the ultimate strategy should be retained
as contingent strategies. Alternatives which are no
longer feasible because of the selection of another





The following recommendations are appropriate for this
study
:
1. A clear distinction should be made between the acqui -
sition strategy and the acquisition plan . The FAR,
DoD FAR Supplement and appropriate directives and
instructions should be revised so that a clear
distinction is made between the acquisition strategy
and the acquisition plan. The conceptual framework
upon which program plans are based should be sepa-
rated from the details found in functional plans. If
this distinction is not made, decisions will be made
on individual details of the program before the basis





The acquisition strategy should serve as a formal
agreement between the PM and the appropriate decision
authority . The approved acquisition strategy should
serve as a formal agreement between the PM and the
decision authority relative to how the program will
be managed. This arrangement would provide a degree
of stability by warding off changes in program
direction.
3 Prospective PM ' s should be assigned during the devel -
opment of the JMSNS . If the PM is a part of the
planning and decision-making prior to the approval of
the JMSNS, it would be easier for him to develop the
acquisition strategy for the program at program
initiation. His early involvement in developing the
summary of the acquisition strategy contained in the
JMSNS would allow him to influence the initial choice
of strategic concepts to be followed.
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4. Feasible Alternatives not selected in the strategy
formulation process at program initiation should be
included in the strategy submitted to higher levels .
Feasible strategy alternatives not selected should be
included in the strategy submitted at program initia-
tion but the details should be limited. A brief
statement that the alternative was considered and the
general rationale for the decision should be
provided. This will help to satisfy those who would





Contingent strategies should be tracked and monitored
but only those dealing with maj or risks or other
critical success factors should be addressed in the
acquisition strategy . Contingent strategies which
address major program risks or other critical success
factors should be included in the acquisition
strategy but the details should be limited. Other
contingent strategies should not be included because
they would clutter and overly complicate the
strategy. The PM could not be expected to briefly,
yet concisely, cover all of the risks and assumptions
which would need to be addressed. He would, however,
be able to answer specific questions on a case-by-
case basis
.
6 The methodology for developing an acquisition
strategy at program initiation set forth in this
thesis should be tested and evaluated . The method-
ology proposed in Chapter V provides a decision-
making structure which could be used by program
managers in the development of their program's acqui-
sition strategy at program initiation. The method-
ology proposed should be tested and evaluated in the
major systems acquisition environment.
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ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
What is an acquisition strategy?
The acquisition strategy is the conceptual basis of
the Program Manager's overall plan for satisfying the
mission need in the most effective, economical, and
timely manner [Ref. 15:p. 34-1]. The strategy
evolves through an iterative process which coincides
with the development of the system. Initially broad
in scope, it becomes increasingly more refined as the
system approaches production and deployment.
'. What are the general policies governing the develop-
ment of an individual program acquisition strategy?
There are a number of program planning documents
which require the development of an acquisition
strategy. These include OMB Circular A- 109, the FAR,
and various instructions and directives issued by the
DoD and the individual services . The general policy
is that an acquisition strategy will be developed
describing the overall plan for the acquisition at
the initiation of a program. This strategy is incor-
porated in the various program documents (e.g.,
Systems Concept Paper) , and updated throughout the
life of the program. Listings of items which could
typically be included in the acquisition strategy are
provided but specific requirements were not found.
3. What are the significant factors which need to be
considered in the development of an acquisition
strategy?
There are many factors which need to be considered in




a. The strategy, policies, objectives and priorities
of higher levels.
b. The technological, cost, and schedule risks
involved
;
c. The impact of economic and political pressures;
d. The impact of the program documentation and review
process ; and
e. Resource limitations and Schedule requirements.
4. How could these factors be integrated into a method-
ology which could be used by program managers?
The methodology proposed in Chapter V is based on
answering the following questions:
a. What is to be accomplished?
b. Why must it be accomplished?
c. Who is responsible for accomplishing it?
d. When is the requirement to be satisfied?
e. How is the requirement to be satisfied?
The development of a program's acquisition strategy, which
will determine how the requirement will be satisfied, is
largely based on the amount of guidance provided to the PM
and the answers to the preceding questions. The answer to
the question of how the acquisition will be accomplished
involves determining what the strategy, policies, objec-
tives, and priorities of higher levels are; determining all
of the strategy options available; and evaluating these
options in relation to the guidance provided. The result of
this process will be a list of feasible strategy- options
that are available to the PM . The task facing the PM is the
70
consolidation and integration of these feasible alternatives
into a strategic plan which will provide the necessary
guidance to functional planners and provide the broad
concepts, objectives and policies which will guide the
acquisition.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. A study should be conducted to determine the latitude
currently available to the PM in the development of
an acquisition strategy. In particular, the study
should assess the impact of the program documentation
and review process and the effect that existing regu-
lations, directives and instructions have on the
strategy options available to the PM.
2. A number of program acquisition strategies should be
studied to determine how they evolved during the
course of the acquisition.
3. An evaluation of the strategy formulation procedures
of private firms should be conducted to determine if
the principles and procedures used are transferable
to the major systems acquisition process.
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1. How would you define acquisition strategy?
2. What are the major factors that need to be considered in
the development of an acquisition strategy?
3. Which of these factors "drive" the decision-making
process (what are the key factors)?
4. Which of these factors is the most difficult to defini-
tize?
5. How do you identify these factors?
6. When must these factors be identified (timetable)?
7. How are these factors integrated into a cohesive plan?
8. What advice would you give a prospective program manager
so that he could avoid some of the 'pitfalls" involved in
developing an acquisition strategy at program initiation?
9. What management tools are used to ensure that all
options have been identified?
10. What steps are taken to ensure that future options are
not inadvertently excluded as a result of decisions made
early in the process?
11. If an option is inadvertently excluded, how do you
recapture it?
12. How are the different initiatives (e.g., competition,
standardization, inter/ intr'aoperability , spare part
breakout) accommodated?
13. What resources are available to the program manager to
assist him in the development of an acquisition strategy?
Personnel?
Directives, instructions, manuals, guides?
Management tools?
14. What resources does the program manager need within the
program office in order to develop an effective acquisition
strategy?
15. What support external to the program office is required?
16. What are the key procedural aspects involved in devel-
oping an acquisition strategy at program initiation?
17. How is the acquisition strategy refined during the
evolution of the program?
18. What steps could be taken by a program manager to




. What types of
the development of
constraints or limitations are placed on
an acquisition strategy?
£9: ?n your experience, is the acquisition strategy truely aliving document or is it produced and forgotten?
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APPENDIX C
EXCERPT OF SUBPART 7.1, FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION
7.105 Contents of written acquisition plans.
In order to facilitate attainment of the acquisition objec-
tives, the plan must identify those milestones at which
decisions must be made (see subparagraph (b)(19) below).
The plan shall address all the technical, business, manage-
ment, and other significant considerations that will control
the acquisition. The specific content of plans will vary,
depending on the nature, circumstances, and stage of the
acquisition. In preparing the plan, the planner shall follow
the applicable instructions in paragraphs (a) and (b) below,
together with the agency's implementing procedures.
(a) Acquisition background and objectives.
1. Statement of need. Introduce the plan by a brief
statement of the need. Summarize the technical and
contractual history of the acquisition. Discuss
feasible acquisition alternatives and any related
in-house effort.
2. Applicable conditions. State all significant condi-
tions affecting the acquisition, such as (i) require-
ments for compatibility with existing or future
systems or programs and (ii) any known cost,
schedule, and capability or performance constraints.
3. Cost . Set forth the established cost goals for the
acquisition and the rationale supporting them, and
discuss related cost concepts to be employed,
including, as appropriate, the following items:
Life- cycle cost. Discuss how life-cycle cost
b~e considered . If it is not used, explain
why. If appropriate, discuss the cost model used
to develop life-cycle cost estimates.
Jili
(ii) Desjgn- to-cost . Describe the design- to- cost
obj ective ( s ) and underlying assumptions, including
the rationale for quantity, learning- curve , and
economic adjustment factors. Describe how objec-
tives are to be applied, tracked, and enforced.
Indicate specific related solicitation and contrac-
tual requirements to be imposed.
(iii) Application of should- cost . Describe the
application of should- cost analysis to the
acquisition.
4. Capability of performance . Specify the required
capabilities or performance characteristics or the
supplies or services being acquired and state how
they are related to the need.
5. Delivery or performance -period requirements .
Describe the basis for establishing delivery or
performance- period requirements. Explain and
provide reasons for any urgency if it results in
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concurrency of development and production or
constitutes justification for noncompetitive
contracting.
6. Trade-offs . Discuss the expected consequences of
trade-offs among the various cost, capability or
performance, and schedule goals.
7. Risks . Discuss technical, cost and schedule risks
and describe what efforts are planned or underway to
reduce risk and the consequences of failure to
achieve goals. If concurrency of development and
production is planned, discuss its effects on cost
and schedule risks.
(b) Plan of action.
1. Sources . Indicate the prospective sources of
supplies and/or services that will meet the need.
Consider required sources of supplies and services.
Include considerations of small business, small
disadvantaged business, and labor surplus area
concerns. If the acquisition or a part of it is for
commercial or commercial- type products, address the
results of market research and analysis and indicate
their impact on the various elements of the plan.
2. Competition . Describe how will be sought, promoted,
and sustained throughout the course of the acquisi-
tion. Discuss component breakout for competition, if
applicable. If noncompetitive contracting is being
recommended, identify the source and discuss why
competition cannot be used. Justification for a
noncompetitive acquisition may be referenced and
attached to the plan.
3. Source- selection procedures . Discuss the source-
selection procedures for ~the acquisition, including
the timing for submission and evaluation of propo-
sals
,
and the relationship of evaluation factors to
the attainment of the acquisition objectives.
4. Contracting considerations. For each contract
contemplated, discuss contract type selection; use of
multiyear contracting, options, or other special
contracting methods; any special clauses, special
solicitation provisions, or FAR deviations required;
whether formal advertising or negotiation will be
used and why; whether equipment will be acquired by
lease or purchase and why; and any other contracting
considerations
.
5. Authority for contracting by negotiation . If
contracting by negotiation is contemplated , cite the
authority for using negotiation and discuss the basis
for selecting that particular authority. If a D&F tojustify negotiation will be required and the acquisi-
tion plan will be used to support that D&F, provide
the information needed.
6. Budgeting and funding . Describe how budget estimates
were derived and discuss the schedule for obtaining
adequate funds at the time when they are required.
7. Product descriptions . In accordance with Part 10,
explain tlTe choice of product description types to be




and allotments . When
urgency of the requirement dictates a particularly
short delivery or performance schedule, certain
priorities may apply. If so, specify the method for
obtaining and using priorities, allocations, and
allotments, and the reasons for them.
9. Contract versus Governmen t performance . Address the
consideration given to OMB Circular No. A-76.
10. Management information requirements . Discuss, as
appropriate^ what management system will be used by
the Government to monitor the contractor's effort.
11. Make or buy . Discuss any consideration given to
make-or-buy programs.
12. Test and evaluation . To the extent applicable,
describe the test program of the contractor and the
Government. Describe the test program for each major
phase of a major system acquisition. If concurrency
is planned, discuss the extent of testing to be
accomplished before production release.
13. Logistics considerations . Describe-
(i) The assumptions determining contractor or
agency support, both initially and over the life of
the acquisition, including consideration of
contractor or agency maintenance servicing and
distribution of commercial products;
(ii) The reliability, maintainability, and quality
assurance requirements, including any planned use
of warranties; and
fiii) The requirements for contractor data
(including repurchase data) and data rights, their
estimated costs, and the use to be made of the
data.
14. Government- furnished property . Indicate any property
To b~e furnished to contractors
,
including material
and facilities, and discuss any associated considera-
tions, such as its availability or the schedule for
its acquisition.
15. Government- furnished information. Discuss any
Government information, such as manuals , drawings,
and test data, to be provided to prospective offerors
and contractors.
16. Environmental considerations. Discuss environmental
issues associated with the acquisition, the applica-
bility of an environmental assessment or environ-
mental impact statement, the proposed resolution of
environmental issues, and any environment -related
requirements to be included in solicitations and
contracts
.
17. Security considerations. For acquisitions dealing
with classified matters , discuss how adequate
security will be established, maintained, and
monitored.
18. Other considerations. Discuss, as applicable, energy
conservation measures, standardization concepts, the
industrial readiness program, the Defense Production
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Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, foreign
sales implications, and any other matters germane to
the plan not covered elsewhere.
19. Milestonees for the acquisition cycle . Address the
following steps and any others appropriate:
Acquisition plan approval.
D&F approval.






Evaluation of proposals, audits, and field reports.
Beginning and completion of negotiations.
Contract preparation, review, and clearance.
Contract award.
20. Identification of participants in acquisition plan
preparation ; List the individuals who participated












3. Office of Federal Procurement Policy Pamphlet No. 1,
Maj or Systems Acquisition- -A Discussion of the
Application of~0Mb Circular No . A- 109
,
August T97 6.




5. Ackoff. R. L
.
, A Concept of Corporate Planning, John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 19 70. —







7. Ewing, D. W. , ed. , Long-Range Planning for Management
,
3rd ed. , Harper & Row, 19727
8. Kelly, C. A., "The Three Planning Questions: A Fable,"
Business Horizons
,
pp. 46-48, March-April 1983.
9. Thompson, A. A. Jr., and Strickland, A. J. Ill,






10. Hofer, C. W. and Schendel, D., Strategy Formulation:
Analytical Concepts
,
West Publishing Company! 1978
.
11. Koontz, H. "Making Strategic Planning Work," Business
Horizons
, pp. 37-47, April 1976.
12. Christensen. C. R. , and others, Business Policy- -Text
and Cases , 4th ed . , R. D. Irwin, Inc . , T9"78~^
13. Vancil, R. F., "Strategy Formulation in Complex




14. Army Procurement Research Office Report 904,
Acquisition Strategy Development, by D. D. Kittle and
H. b\ Williams, February 1981.
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15. Federal Acquisition Regulation , U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D . C
.
, 1984.
16. Berzins, A. T. and Cohen, B. L
.
, Acquisition Strategy :
Concept and Definition, M.S'. The sis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey , California, March 1977.
17. The Rand Corporation Report R- 733-PR/ARPA, System
Acquisition Strategies
,
by R. Perry, and others.
18. The Rand Corporation Report P-4794, Choice Among
Strategies for System Acquisition
,
by A. 3~. Harman,
March 1972.
19. The Analytic Sciences Corporation Report TR-1375,
Feasibility and Development Study for a System
Acquisition Strategy ModeT^ by L^ WT Cox , and It. AT
Hu I lander , 12 January 1981
.
20. Nelson, R. E., Leader/ Follower Second Sourcing
Strategy a s Implemented by the JoTnt Cruise Missile
Proj ecc CTf f ice
,
M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School , Monterey , California, September 1980.
21. Moore, W. F., "The Associate Contractor Strategy for
Systems Acquisition," Defense Management Journal, pp.
35-40, 2nd Quarter 1982":
22. Department of Defense Supplement to the Federal
Acquisition "Regulation, u . S . Government- Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 1984.
23. "The B-1B Bomber- -What Are We Waiting For?" Government
Executive
,
pp. 33-35, November 1981.
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